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How Many Kicks at the Cat?1:
Multiple Settlement Protests by Class Members Who Have Refused to Opt Out
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that any settlement of a pending
class action be approved by order of the reviewing district court under Rule 23(e).2 This
settlement approval, by right, is appealable by any “party” to the action. Since the named
plaintiffs and the defendant have, of course, negotiated the settlement, it is an infrequent
occurrence that one of the named “parties” would desire to appeal settlement approval.
But a class action necessarily involves other participants, namely the nonnamed class
members, whose status for purposes of appeal was unsettled prior to 2002.3 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Devlin v. Scardalletti4 solidified the right of class action settlement
objectors to appeal the approval of a class settlement despite a failure to timely intervene
under Rule 24 to become parties to the action.5 By broadening the range of participants
who could appeal a settlement approval, and relegating the once-rigid definition of
“party” to a context-specific question, the Court greatly expanded appellate rights for
absent class members who become settlement objectors.6 Class settlement objectors,
referred to alternatively as “warts on the class action process,” “pond scum,” and “bottom
feeders,”7 may be among “the least popular litigation participants in the history of civil
procedure.”8 Nevertheless, the Court’s decision enhanced, rather than restrained, the
role played by the once unsavory objectors. In doing so, the Court ensured that objectors
could pursue their gripes regarding settlement adequacy beyond the settlement hearing
and into the appellate courts.
However, Devlin concerned a mandatory class, rather than a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out
class that allows putative members to exclude themselves from the class and litigate their
claims individually at the district court level.9 Because the question was not before the
Court, there was no discussion of the effect of a plaintiff’s failure to opt out of a (b)(3)
class action, and then attempt to litigate, at the appellate level, his objection to the
1

Cats are frequently kicked at, though apparently rarely struck, in courts. Most jurisdictions limit parties to
one kick at the cat, see e.g., Conway v. State, 50 Wis.2d 152 (Wis. 1971) (“freely translat[ing]” the Latin
phrases which form the basis of the res adjudicata principle, “Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa” and
“Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” into the more populist, “No one is entitled to more than one kick at
the cat.”) (quoting Hon. Lewis J. Charles, Res Adjudicata and Estoppel by Judgment, Wisconsin Bar
Bulletin (June, 1959, at 25)); though there is documented evidence of one litigation party attempting as
many as eight kicks at a single cat. Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (“it is
unfathomable …to remand this matter to give the claimant an eighth kick at the cat”) (Coffey, J.,
dissenting) (ellipsis added) (emphasis in original).
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)
3
See Section II.A., infra.
4
Devlin v. Scardalletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
5
Prior to Devlin, the circuits were split on this question. See Section II.A., infra.
6
See Section II.B., infra.
7
See Brunet, supra Note 32 at 411 (culling the less savory references to objectors).
8
Id.
9
Under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), a plaintiff in a class action for primarily monetary damages, as opposed to
injunctive relief or a limited fund case ((b)(1) or (b)(2)), has an opportunity to exclude himself from the
class litigation or settlement.
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settlement.10 What was made clear is that a person becomes a party, for purposes of
entitlement to appeal, if he is coercively bound by a settlement in a mandatory class after
having no opportunity to individually pursue his claim.
Following Devlin, the question remains whether such an appeal right inures to
objectors who have failed to exercise their rights under subsection (b)(3) to opt out11 at
either the class certification or settlement stage.12 At this point, the reader may be asking,
“[b]ut what does it all mean, Basil?”13 Will denying or allowing appellate rights for
absent members who have failed to opt out have any practical effect on class actions?
Seeking to answer those questions, this paper will argue that failure to opt out of a class,
either prior to settlement or at the settlement stage, should, in the interests of efficiency
and equity, foreclose the opportunity to appeal a district court’s settlement approval.
Section I discusses the multitude of protections available to absent class members, and,
more specifically, the role of opt-outs and objectors in the (b)(3) class action settlement
process. Section II discusses the effect Devlin has had on the appellate rights of
nonnamed plaintiffs, and details the attempts by subsequent courts to limit the scope of
Devlin. Section III outlines possible situations where this question of non-opt-out
appeals might arise in a (b)(3) class, and concludes that limitation of the appeal right is
the only sensible solution to this unanswered question.
I. THE PLETHORA OF PLAINTIFF PROTECTIONS IN THE CLASS ACTION
From the embryonic stages of potential class action litigation, numerous
mechanisms exist to protect the individual rights and interests of aggrieved parties,
particularly in the case of a (b)(3) class. Despite the plethora of protections,
disagreement persists within the academic community about how to resolve the tensions
that exist within prospective and certified classes, particularly as it relates to
representative plaintiffs vis-à-vis absent,14 or nonnamed, class members.15 The non10

See infra Note 51.
See Don Zupanec, Appealability -- Opt-Out Class Actions -- Approval of Settlement, 19 No. 3 FED. LITIG.
16 (March 2004) (“The jury is still out on whether, in an opt-out action, unnamed class members who
object to a settlement but elect not to exercise their opt-out rights may appeal approval of the settlement
without intervening in the district court.”).
12
It is entirely possible that certification and settlement occur contemporaneously. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23
annot.; See also Deborah Hensler, Symposium: What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of
Civil Justice on the American Economy and Policy: As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem
and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, n.47 (discussing the “settlement class action,” whereby a class is certified
solely for the purpose of settlement).
13
AUSTIN POWERS: THE SPY WHO SHAGGED ME (New Line Cinema 1999).
14
The terms absent, nonnamed, and unnamed will be used interchangeably to describe class members who
are not named as representative parties.
15
See e.g. Jocelyn D. Larkin, Incentive Awards to Class Representatives in Class Action Settlements,
available at http://www.impactfund.org/pages/articles/Class%20Member%20Bonuses.doc (last visited May
3, 2005) (noting that many commentators have questioned the propriety of incentive payments for
representatives); The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S.274, 108th Cong. (2003) (Congressional
legislation seeking, inter alia, the elimination of incentive payments to named class members); and
Deborah R. Hensler, Article: Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other
Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 179 (2001) (remarking that, with respect to class
actions, “[t]oday there is a sense again that monsters are loose in the land.”).
11
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exhaustive, mostly chronological, list of plaintiff protections, with some options not
available in every instance, includes: the opportunity to be a named plaintiff or class
representative, thus ensuring at least some measure of control over the litigation and class
counsel; the right in certain cases (specifically those brought under section (b)(3) of Rule
23) to opt out and pursue, or more accurately, preserve the right to pursue, claims
individually;16 the right to move to intervene as a full “party,” which is available to any
class member under Rule 24;17 permissive exclusion of class members by the court under
the recently amended Rule 23(e)(3) in a (b)(3) class settlement;18 objection at the fairness
hearing to a settlement under Rule 23(e)(4);19 and ultimately, in some cases, appeal of a
settlement after it has been approved by a district court.20
In addition to these basic protections, several features of class action
jurisprudence, and of Rule 23, are specifically intended to protect the rights and interests
of nonnamed class members when those interests differ from their representatives’. 21 In
addition to the numerosity and commonality requirements,22 Rule 23(a) requires that
class representatives’ claims be “typical” of the class claims,23 and that the interests of
the class as a whole are “fairly and adequately” protected by their representatives,
including the named plaintiffs and class counsel.24 Rule 23(e) requires that a court
approve any settlement of a class claim, and 23(e)(4) affords any class member the
opportunity to object to a proposed settlement.25 Additionally, Rule 23(e)(3) allows a
court to refuse any settlement of a (b)(3) class action that does not afford absent class
members a second opt-out opportunity once the proposed settlement is announced.26 A
16

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
18
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) advisory committee’s note (The advisory committee notes to the 2003
amendments state that “Subdivision (e) is amended to strengthen the process of reviewing proposed classaction settlements.” The new (e)(3) gives a court discretion to deny settlement approval if a new opt-out
opportunity is not provided at the settlement stage, because the “decision to remain in the class is likely to
be more carefully considered and is better informed when the settlement terms are known.”)
19
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) requires that a court conduct a fairness hearing prior to the approval of any
settlement. The hearing gives objectors an opportunity, through counsel if desired, to voice their
displeasure with the proposed settlement. A settlement will be approved only if it is “fair, reasonable, and
adequate.” Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(c).
20
It should be noted at the outset, of course, that the grant of an appeal may signify a victory that is nothing
more than Pyrrhic, as appeals are far more costly than opt-outs or objections, and courts of appeal are
reluctant to overturn a district court’s approval of a settlement, in part due to the policy favoring voluntary
class settlements, and in part because the district court’s decision will be reviewed with the heightened
abuse of discretion standard. See e.g. Freeman v. Berge, 68 Fed. Appx. 783 (7th Cir. 2003) (“review of the
district court’s decision to approve the agreement, however, is narrow; we will reverse only if the district
court abused its discretion.”).
21
See e.g., In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass 2005) (compiling cases providing
protections for nonnamed class members in settlement).
22
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) and (a)(2).
23
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
24
The adequacy requirement is contained in FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
25
See Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Article: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: A Need for Technical Innovation,
104 DICK. L. REV 653 n.107 (2000) (“The purpose of seeking objections from absent class members is to
alert a trial court to divergent views and aid the court in identifying possible inadequacies in the
settlement.”).
26
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) (2003 amend.).
17
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(b)(3) class action, one for primarily money damages, necessarily gives each class
member at least one opportunity to opt out of the action.27 With all of these procedural
protections, an inference arises that there is a preference for dissident members, and that
members of the class who are not “playing ball” may have too many procedural rights
that are otherwise not available to members of the class who are seeking resolution by
settlement.28
A. The Opt-Out Option in (b)(3) Classes
Devlin concerned a mandatory class, and its reasoning was based, at least in part,
on the fact that the objector was part of a class where opt-out rights were not afforded.29
Nonnamed plaintiffs in mandatory (i.e. (b)(1) and (b)(2)) classes are in an awkward
position; they are bound by the decisions of the named plaintiffs and class counsel, with
whom they have little or no involvement or interaction. The settlement that is to bind
them does so “coercively,” in that there is no opportunity to distance themselves from the
class, the named plaintiffs, or class counsel.30 The plaintiff Devlin, for instance, filed an
individual claim, moved for intervention, and objected at the fairness hearing, yet
remained a member of the mandatory class who was to be bound by the settlement
agreement. A plaintiff who is offered the option to opt out is in a considerably different
position.
The opt-out mechanism is the means by which a (b)(3) class member may choose
who will represent his interests before the court. By opting out, a class member
“[p]reserve[es] the right to litigate individually, as one’s own champion.”31 By electing
to remove himself from the class, the opt-out plaintiff “avoids any risk of the class’s loss
on the merits and also forswears any opportunity to take advantage of the class’s
victory.”32 Particularly with a settlement-only class or a second settlement opt-out
available to comply with 23(e)(3), where the terms of the settlement, and by extension the
outcome of the class litigation, is known, the decision to opt out is made with full
information.33
On the other hand, by not opting out of a (b)(3) class, “the unnamed class
members effectively cho[o]se their class representatives.”34 While this is not literally
true, of course, in that nonnamed class members ordinarily take no affirmative steps in
27

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(b) requires “that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests
exclusion.”
28
For an early discussion of this issue, see Timothy A. Duffy, The Appealability of Class Action
Settlements by Unnamed Parties, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (Summer 1993) (advocating appeal rights for
unnamed class members, a position subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court).
29
See Section II.B., infra.
30
David R. Clay, Comment: Federal Attraction for the Interstate Class Action: The effect of Devlin v.
Scardalletti and the Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) on Class Action “Minimal
Diversity” Concerns, 52 Emory L.J. 1877, 1904 (2003).
31
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003).
32
Id. (citing Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987)).
33
See advisory committee notes, supra Note 13.
34
Clay, supra, Note 30 at 1904-05.
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the selection of representatives,35 plaintiffs who choose not to opt out are impliedly
consenting to be represented by class counsel and to be bound by their decisions. By
foregoing the opportunity to exclude themselves from the class, class members are
agreeing to “dance with them what brung ‘em”36 to the litigation in the first instance.
B. The Role of Objectors
If the opt-out procedure is designed to preserve absent class members’ individual
rights to pursue their claims, the fairness hearing and objection procedure is intended to
give nonnamed class members a voice in deciding the fate of the entire class, named and
nonnamed members alike.37 Along with the “adequacy of representation” requirements
of Rule 23(a)(4), objection allows absent members to assure that the named plaintiffs’
interests are representative of the other members of the class, and not merely clay to be
manipulated by the attorneys negotiating the settlement.38 Objecting, then, is the
procedural equivalent of nonnamed class members attempting to co-opt the named
plaintiff “dates” brought39 by class counsel and disrupt the settlement the representative
parties had reached with the defendant.
While the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(e) codified the right of any class member
to object at the fairness hearing, the role objectors play in ensuring settlement fairness
and efficiency has been called into question by courts and commentators. This objection
to objectors stems from the ability of a lone wolf dissident to single-handedly hold up a
settlement that has the approval of the rest of the class.40 On the other hand, if indeed
“[a]bsentees are the reason the class action device exists,”41 then the objection is the only
tool available for the rights of members of the otherwise silent majority to be vocalized
35

But see John Bronsteen and Owen Fiss, Article: The Class Action Rule, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1419
(2003) (proposing that every class action should require an affirmative opt-in for a settlement class). There
has not been a great rush to adopt this proposed measure. See Note 117, infra.
36
See In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943 (D. Ill. 2001) (appointing class counsel and directing
lead plaintiff to “dance with the law firm that brung him.”). For an interesting note on the derivation of this
phrase, see Brian D. Shannon, Symposium: “Dancing With the One That Brung Us” –Why the Texas ADR
Community has Declined to Embrace the UMA, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 197 (2003) (attributing this old
political maxim to University of Texas football coach Darryl Royal); But see also Patrick Emery Longan,
Upper-Level Courses: Elder Law Across the Curriculum: Professional Responsibility, 30 STETSON L. REV,
1413, 1426n.10 (stating that the phrase, if not the guiding principle, is peculiar to the state of Texas, and
helpfully offering the sage advice, “I do not recommend the use of this phrase outside of the Lone Star
State.”).
37
See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 403 (2003).
38
Several commentators have questioned the role of named plaintiffs and their relationship with class
counsel, See e.g. Larkin, supra Note 15 (summarizing case authority on incentive payments for
representative plaintiffs and describing the “struggle” for class counsel in setting a fair bonus amount.)
39
See Note 36, supra.
40
See e.g., Rosenbaum v. McAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1442 (10th Cir. 1995) (questioning wisdom of allowing
one objector to prevent the benefits of class settlement from passing to other class members: “[t]o allow a
nonintervening class member to appeal approval of a settlement would permit one dissident--and there is
likely always to be one--to postpone realization of any of the benefits that might otherwise come to the
class members and to prevent the defendant from settling its liability.”).
41
Id. at 419.
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and represented.42 The advisory committee notes to the 2003 amendments confirm that
subsection (e)(4) preserves for members the right to object to any disposition that would
be binding on them, including settlement.43
C. Due Process Concerns: Other Means by Which Interests are Preserved and Protected
Already armed with the objection right, and with opt-out available as an escape
route, is it wise to further extend procedural due process rights for absent class members
in a (b)(3) action? Mathews v. Eldridge44 is the leading Supreme Court authority on the
contours and limits of procedural due process. In Eldridge the Court defined the
necessary rights that must be granted in order to preserve due process when an individual
is deprived of liberty or property,45 stating that the “fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.’”46 Due process does not afford every person the opportunity to be heard at
every level of tribunal. The Eldridge court established a test for measuring the
constitutional sufficiency of procedural safeguards that included an analysis of: (1) the
private interest affected; (2) the risk that the private interest was erroneously deprived by
the procedures used; and (3) the fiscal and administrative burdens to the government if
additional procedures are used.47
In the situation of a hypothetical objector who has refused to opt out of a (b)(3)
action, the analysis shows that her constitutional due process rights have been more than
adequately protected by the procedures that stop just short of granting the right to appeal
from any settlement approval. It is axiomatic that not every class member can have a
constitutionally protected property right in the settlement of her choice, but only in a fair
settlement.48 The affected property right at issue then is merely an expectation right in a
larger figure in settlement. The procedure that ensures a fair and adequate settlement is
the bifurcated fairness determination in the district court, which includes a fairness
hearing and independent review of the settlement by the judge.49 During this process, a
district judge “must exercise the highest degree of vigilance because in the settlement
phase of a class action [the judge] is a fiduciary of the class.”50 A district court judge,
then, acts as the surrogate fiduciary representative of absent class members during
settlement approval.

42

Of course, a court’s settlement approval necessarily requires an examination of the adequacy of
representation, but the fairness hearing is an absent class member’s only opportunity to be heard on the
record without intervention or institution of a collateral procedure.
43
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee notes.
44
424 U.S. 319 (1976)
45
Id. at 333. The assumption that must be made to entertain this question is that an absent class member
who receives a settlement that displeases him has a protected property right in the class settlement.
46
Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
47
Id. at 336.
48
See Bronsteen and Fiss, supra Note 35 at 1444 (“Not every fair agreement is the best agreement that the
absent class members could legitimately expect.”).
49
See Larkin, supra Note 10.
50
Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P'ship, L.P. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 212 F.R.D. 400 (E.D.Wis.
2002).
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The administrative burden at issue if appeal is allowed is no greater than the
allowance of any other appeal, but the concern raised would be that if every objector
could simply appeal the settlement, rather than opt out, the class would have devolved
into multiple individual lawsuits, but at the appellate, rather than district court, level.
Allowing absent class members in a (b)(3) class to effectively leapfrog the district court
step and take their now individual cases directly to the more crowded court of appeals is
not consistent with judicial economy or logic.51 This option becomes particularly less
appealing when the available procedures make the erroneous deprivation of a right
unlikely; and the right at issue is a mere expectancy in a larger settlement.
If the denial of an appeal does not raise significant due process concerns, then it
follows that the available procedural safeguards are sufficient to protect the rights of
absent class members. In addition to the opt-out and objection rights, absent class
members may also collaterally attack the adequacy of the representation of named
members or counsel in negotiating the settlement, which would only be necessary if their
fiduciary in the judiciary52 was not up to the task. Further, a party may undoubtedly still
intervene in the action and preserve his appellate rights. Given all the available methods
for nonnamed class members to ensure that they or their representatives will be able to
protect their rights, can Devlin possibly be read to extend to (b)(3) opt-out classes?

II. DEVLIN CONSIDERABLY EXPANDED APPELLATE RIGHTS FOR
NONNAMED PLAINTIFFS
Devlin’s central holding is that nonnamed plaintiffs in a mandatory class, despite
their failure to intervene in the action, preserve their right to appeal a settlement approval
if they have objected at the 23(e)(4) fairness hearing.53 The dissent,54 and a majority of
circuits prior to Devlin, would have held that a nonnamed class member was required to
timely intervene (and presumably also object at the fairness hearing) to preserve the right
to appeal the District Court’s approval of a settlement.55
A. The Pre-Devlin varied approach
Before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Devlin, the Circuits were split as
to whether a nonnamed plaintiff was required to intervene formally under Rule 24 in
order to preserve his or her right to appeal the approval of a settlement.56 The majority
51

See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“Since when has it become a principle of our judicial
administration that what can be left to the appellate level should be left to the appellate level? Quite the
opposite is true. District judges, who issue their decrees in splendid isolation, can be multiplied ad
infinitum. Courts of appeals cannot be staffed with too many judges without destroying their ability to
maintain, through en banc hearings, a predictable law of the circuit.”) (emphasis in original).
52
See Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, supra note 50.
53
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 14.
54
(Scalia, J., joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas)
55
Devlin at 15 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
56
See Devlin at 6 (discussing circuit split); and Clay, supra Note 30 at 1893 (same). For a lengthier preDevlin discussion of the varying approaches taken by the circuits, see Duffy, supra Note 28.

8

approach was that taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Guthrie v. Evans,57 holding that
individual, nonnamed class members do not have standing to appeal a judgment on behalf
of a class. To allow appeals by nonnamed parties, without requiring intervention, not
only would make class actions “unmanageable and non-productive,”58 but would “defeat
the very purpose of class action lawsuits.”59 The “fundamental purpose of the class
action” that would be defeated is the ability to “render manageable litigation that involves
numerous members of a homogeneous class, who would all otherwise have access to the
court through individual lawsuits.”60 Because of the availability of such devices as
intervention, collateral attack on the adequacy of representation, and opt-out, the court
saw no reason to allow nonnamed parties to appeal an order that is binding on the class.61
This approach was subsequently adopted by the Tenth,62 Sixth,63 Fifth,64 and Fourth65
Circuits, with an arguably stronger position being taken by the Tenth Circuit in Gottlieb
v. Wiles. The Gottlieb court feared the demise of the class action device if nonnamed
class members were permitted to appeal without intervention, saying “[s]uch a result
would … eviscerate the utility of the class action suit.”66
By contrast, the Third67 and Second68 Circuits had followed the lead of the Ninth
Circuit in Marshall v. Holiday Magic,69 holding that nonnamed class members have
standing to appeal without first intervening, because “their legal rights are affected by the
settlement.”70 It was this more permissive line of authority that the Supreme Court
followed in Devlin, finding that the nonnamed class member was a “member of the class
bound by the judgment,”71 and so clearly met the requirements of prudential standing,72
qualifying him as a party for purposes of appeal.
B. Devlin and its reasoning
The Devlin Court73 justified its holding with the rationale that, following a timely
but unsuccessful objection and an approved settlement, the interest of the objecting class
member has sufficiently diverged from the rest of the class so as to require allowing the
57

815 F.2d 626 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 628.
59
Id. at 629.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 628. Peculiarly, the Guthrie appellant did not have the opportunity to opt out of the mandatory
(b)(2) class, but the court nevertheless denied his motion to appeal based on the other options available.
62
Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 1993).
63
Shults v. Champion Int’l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 1994).
64
Cook v. Powell Buick, Inc., 155 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1998).
65
Scardalletti v. Debarr, 265 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2001).
66
Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1009. See also Clay, 52 Emory L.J. at 1893 (noting the Tenth Circuit’s adoption and
expansion of the “judicial economy rationale”).
67
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 1993).
68
In re Paine Webber Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 94 F.3d 49 (2nd Cir. 1996).
69
550 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977).
70
Id. at 1176.
71
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 7.
72
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 7.
73
(O’Connor, J.).
58
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objector, in the words of one commentator, “another bite at the apple.”74 This result, the
Court reasoned, is mandated by the divergent interests present, in a (b)(1) mandatory (i.e.
non-opt-out) class, once a party becomes bound by a settlement despite his protests at the
fairness hearing. “To hold otherwise would deprive nonnamed class members of the
power to preserve their own interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind them,
despite their expressed objections before the trial court.”75
Devlin the individual, interestingly enough, was originally proposed as a named
plaintiff.76 He declined the invitation to represent the class, and pursued an individual
claim against the disputed pension plan.77 Devlin’s individual claims were dismissed,78
and the (b)(1) mandatory class, of which Devlin was a part, was conditionally certified
consequent to, and as part of, settlement negotiations. Devlin, by bringing his individual
claim, had unsuccessfully attempted to effect a pseudo-opt-out, and ultimately became
part of the mandatory (b)(1) class. He then objected to the proposed settlement at the
fairness hearing and filed an untimely motion to intervene.79 Clearly, by exercising the
panoply of available options, Devlin indicated that he wanted no part of the settlement
agreement, and the Court sympathized with his plight, remarking that:
[p]articularly in light of the fact that petitioner had no ability to opt out of the
settlement, appealing the approval of the settlement is [Devlin’s] only means of
protecting himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he finds
unacceptable and that a reviewing court might find legally inadequate.80
Justice Scalia and the dissent took issue with the Court’s loosey-goosey approach
to “party” definition, derisively questioning the scope of the “oh-so-sophisticated new
inquiry.”81 The offending inquiry, adopted by the majority, included the preface that
“[t]he label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion
about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”82
Perhaps more notably, the dissent questioned the majority’s “sunny surmise that the
appeals will be few” in light of the new expanded rights.83 By requiring an objector to
intervene in order to preserve his appeal right, the dissent believed district courts would
be able to “perform an important screening function”84 and substantially limit the

74

David R. Clay, supra Note 30 at 1898.
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
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availability of appeal for certain objectors.85 Devlin did not address the question, and it
remains open, what effect the opportunity to opt out of a settlement would have on the
now-determinative “context,” and consequently the applicability of procedural rules
granting or denying appellate rights.
C. Ballard and the Debate Over Whether to Apply Devlin to Opt-out classes
1. Several courts have since chosen to limit or question the applicability of
Devlin.
Following Devlin, and with a particular focus on the Court’s “no ability to opt
out” rationale86 for allowing the appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to extend
Devlin to an opt-out class certified under the state class action rule paralleling Federal
Rule 23(b)(3).87 The court repeatedly characterized the appellants’ failure to opt out or
timely intervene as a calculated, strategic risk that they might become bound by the
settlement.88 By objecting at the fairness hearing, but not opting out of the settlement, the
objecting parties had, in the court’s words, “sat on their rights and waited until they were
not satisfied with the way the litigation was progressing.”89 When the objectors finally
moved for intervention, the court denied the motion as untimely.90 The Ballard
objectors, then, by “sitting on their rights,” had lost standing to appeal approval of the
settlement, and were bound by a settlement to which they objected due to their failure to
opt out.
Two federal circuit courts have subsequently endorsed the reasoning of Ballard in
dicta.91 In Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.92 the Tenth Circuit passed on the
opportunity to comment on the scope of Devlin93 when it denied the appeal of class
action objectors who had failed to opt out of a (b)(3) class. But, in doing so, the court
noted Ballard, remarking that “were we to similarly narrow Devlin’s application, this
entire appeal could be dismissed because Objectors did have the right to opt out of the
settlement.”94 The implicit endorsement of Ballard’s reasoning was clear, as the court, in
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denying the objections, stated that “the result of our decision is the same (unfavorable to
Objectors).”95
The Eighth Circuit, in In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litigation,96
similarly denied an appeal from an objector on other grounds, but not before
“question[ing] whether Devlin’s holding applies to opt-out class actions certified under
Rule 23(b)(3).”97 Because the objector’s reason for disapproving the settlement (a
provision that could have prevented some class members from participating) had become
effectively moot (no one was denied relief),98 the court did not dismiss the appeal on the
grounds that the objector had passed on the opportunity to opt out. It is likely, however,
that the appeal would have been dismissed for failure to exercise the opt-out right; the
court questioned the applicability of Devlin to opt-out classes, asserting, “we believe the
limited reading of Devlin has considerable merit.”99 The Eighth Circuit again, in Snell v.
Allianz Life Ins. Co. of No. Am.,100 held Devlin inapplicable to an opt-out class action
where the prospective appellant had opted out of the class, only to be later returned.101
The court refused to consider an appeal of the settlement approval, stating that “Devlin…
does not apply because this is an opt-out class action in which [plaintiff] made no
objections to the settlement in the court below either before settlement was final or after
she was reintroduced to the class.”102
Following the lead of the Eighth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, in AAL High Yield
Bond Fund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP,103 declined to apply Devlin or expressly limit its
scope, but not without comment. The non-party objectors’ argument, the court stated,
“misses the point of Devlin, which was to allow appeals by parties who are actually
bound by a judgment, not parties who merely could have been bound by the
judgment.”104
Finally, and most recently, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida, in
Barnhill v. Fla. Microsoft Antitrust Litig.,105 has “agree[d] with those courts which have
found that the basis of the Devlin decision was that the objectors were bound by the terms
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of the settlement because they did not have the opportunity to opt out.”106 Because the
Supreme Court had explained that this was the “‘most important’ factor”107 and the
instant objectors had failed to opt out, the court reasoned that “there is no reason to allow
them to appeal without intervening.”108
No federal court had yet expressly decided to so limit Devlin, but it appeared that
this would be the path that courts were likely to follow, refusing to extend Devlin to
(b)(3) opt-out classes. This result appeared particularly likely in light of the fact that the
majority of circuits, prior to Devlin, had refused appeal rights even for mandatory (i.e.,
(b)(1)) class members.
2. Some courts, however, have declined opportunities to limit Devlin.
But what confused and unsettled emergent body of law would be complete
without a befuddling appearance by our friends in the occasionally wacky Ninth Circuit?
In Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,109 the court allowed a group of objectors
who had failed to opt out of a (b)(3) class to appeal the district court’s approval of a class
settlement. Finding that Devlin was intended to apply whenever a nonnamed class
member was to be bound by the settlement, the court concluded that the parties’ appellate
rights must be preserved, especially because the miniscule nature of their individual
claims made opting out an unappealing option. Noting that the objectors indeed were
free to opt out of the settlement, the court (O’Scannlain, J.) remarked that “this ostensible
independence is belied by an essential impracticability. Because each objector’s claim is
too small to justify an individual litigation, a class action is the only feasible means of
obtaining relief…. They therefore occupy precisely the status the Devlin Court sought to
protect.”110 So, despite the fact that the objectors had an opportunity to pursue individual
claims as their “own champion,” because the ratio of costs to potential benefits of nonclass litigation apparently was unpalatable, they remained in the class rather than opting
out. Yet they were able to object to the settlement and ultimately (though unsuccessfully)
appeal the approval of that settlement.111
The Tenth Circuit, in In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc.,112 without further
amplification, contemporaneously held that “a class member who does not opt out of a
settlement but objects at the fairness hearing and against whom a final judgment is
entered has the right to appeal the district court’s approval of the settlement.”113 Though
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the court held that failure to opt out does not foreclose appeal of a settlement,114 it is
unclear what, if any, effect In re Integra will have on other circuits. For one, the case
involved a defendant class, which are, in the words of Professor John Coffee, “as rare as
unicorns.”115 Perhaps more importantly, the case limited appeal rights to parties “against
whom a final judgment is entered.”116 Even if we are to assume that a plaintiff class
member qualifies as a person “against whom a final judgment is entered” when his
objection is dismissed, his adverse judgment is markedly different than a defendant class
member who is paying out the contested settlement. A plaintiff who objects, but
nevertheless participates in a settlement (and presumably receives something of value,
however minimal) over his objections, has suffered no real negative impact, other than
perhaps the wounding of pride or deflation of expectations of a grander settlement.

III.
LIMITING OBJECTORS’ APPEAL RIGHTS: ILLUSTRATIVE SITUATIONS
WHERE OBJECTORS MIGHT SEEK TO APPEAL
When would a class member not avail himself of an opportunity to opt out,
remain in the class, and yet insist on objecting to the settlement and then assert an appeal
right if the settlement is approved over the objections? From a (b)(3) settlement, there
could possibly be four types of objectors who had failed or declined to opt out: (A) The
absent-minded objector, who simply fails to opt out in the process either at an initial
certification stage or an optional second (e)(3) opt-out; (B) The conscientious objector,
who strongly disapproves of the settlement as a whole on behalf of the class for one
reason or another; (C) The extortion artist objector, who opposes the settlement in the
hopes that he can reap an individual payoff for eventual withdrawal of his objections; and
(D) The self-interested objector, who feels the settlement does not meet his expectations
of a class settlement, but who lacks either the resources or the leverage to pursue a
greater amount or earn a worthwhile return individually.

A. The Absent-Minded Objector
It is unlikely that a party who inadvertently fails to opt out from a settlement
would be able to, or even want to, later appeal an approved settlement. First, the situation
is not likely to arise with any regularity. Settlement requires the best practicable notice,
consistent with due process.117 It is not an absolute requirement that every class member
actually receive notice,118 so initially there may be a number of class members who
114

Despite the odd procedural history of the case, In re Integra Realty purports to “answer[] the question
[the Tenth Circuit] left open in Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., as to whether Devlin applies to
opt-out class settlements.” 354 F.3d at 1257 (citation omitted).
115
Coffee, ARTICLE: Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).
116
Integra, 354 F.3d at 1257.
117
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that notice by first-class mail is
sufficient to protect due process rights of absent plaintiff class members, and rejecting the suggestion that
plaintiffs should have to opt in to class settlements).
118
See Id.

14

would have opted out, but because they did not actually receive notice, they do not. The
possibility that notice is received and not properly understood, or received and ignored,
always exists. But in each of these situations, notice has been provided and the
opportunity to opt out of the class has passed. It is not entirely clear what purpose would
be served by protecting the appellate interest of a class member who has failed to
participate in the litigation in any way. Rather, the efficient solution is to chalk this
situation up to “rational ignorance.”119 “Rationally ignorant parties remain ignorant of a
legal rule’s existence or lack thereof because the rule does not have any significant effect
on them…. The market only pushes parties to gain information that is valuable or useful
to them.”120 By denying the appeal right in the situation of an absent-minded objector,
parties would be encouraged to discover their legal rights if it would have a significant
effect on them. If not, they should be left in their rationally ignorant bliss.
B. The Conscientious Objector
The high-minded objector who individually attempts to oppose the settlement as a
representative of the whole class, and not for his own financial interests, is a rare breed
indeed. Perhaps he objects to the incentive payments made to representative class
members,121 or simply because he feels that a critically important feature was left out of
the final settlement package. In any event, this admirable attempt to shoulder the
objecting burden of the entire class should not allow appeal as of right after objecting at
the settlement approval stage. If there is truly something objectionable about the
settlement, other members of the class will speak up, and a district judge will exercise her
discretion, acting as a fiduciary for the class, to strike down the settlement.122 If, on the
other hand this is truly a “lone wolf” objector purporting to represent some interest of the
class that no other member has recognized, the court will likely approve the settlement.123
One of the issues a court examines in approving a settlement is the acceptance by the
class. The presence of only a single objector, particularly if coupled with a low opt-out
rate, indicates that a settlement should be, and is likely to be, approved. Allowing a
“crank”124 objector to uphold a settlement that has the approval of the class does not
comport with judicial or economic efficiency.
C. The Extortion Artist Objector
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The extortion artist, in contrast to the conscientious objector, objects with the
purpose of holding up the settlement for his individual gain. By burdening the class, the
extortionist hopes that he will receive an additional payout from those parties to the
litigation that are most interested in settlement. While the crank conscientious objector at
least operates with a noble, though misguided, purpose, there is no justification
whatsoever for allowing the extortionist objector, whose object is merely to frustrate the
settlement and extort a payment, an appeal right. It is lamentable enough that the
settlement is dragged out and payment to pro-settlement class members suspended. It
would be far more wasteful to allow these objectors, who failed in their extortion
attempts and in preventing approval, to further prolong litigation at the appellate level
while another individual settlement is negotiated.
D. The Self-Interested Objector
The only situation where an objector’s appeal rights should arguably be preserved
after failing to opt out is in the situation of a negative value suit. As in the case of the
Churchill Village objectors,125 where the interest at issue is not large enough to justify an
individual suit, the class action may indeed be the only feasible, reasonable method of
pursuing the claim. While the class device aggregates individual claims, in the negative
value situations, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual
suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or fanatic sues for $30.”126 Nevertheless,
the infeasibility of the individual claim should not necessarily create appellate
opportunities as a matter of right. As discussed in Section I.C., supra, the interest
protections built into the class action process ensure that a fair settlement will be reached.
Further, the individual has not been denied all compensation for his claim. Rather, the
class action has made it possible to pursue the claim, a settlement has been reached, and it
is only because the nonnamed plaintiff has not received enough that he chooses to object.

CONCLUSION
The suggestion that an “adversarial void”127 exists whenever class representatives,
or their counsel, negotiate a settlement with defendants is overcome by the presence of
judiciary oversight at the district court level of the settlement negotiations. The district
court’s review must be “exacting and thorough. The task is demanding because the
adversariness of litigation is often lost after the agreement to settle.”128 With this
heightened review, and the role of judge as fiduciary, the class representatives have
means by which they can protect themselves, including opt out and objection, and the
assistance of the court in guaranteeing a fair and adequate settlement. Allowing an
appeal may simply go too far in providing an opportunity for a small minority of absent
class members to try to squeeze the last drops out of a settlement.
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By way of illustration, if the Ninth Circuit’s approach is followed, it appears that
a plaintiff, injured or aggrieved in some legally cognizable way that affects a potential
(b)(3) class, may first refuse to be named as a class representative (Devlin) or to
participate in the class litigation in any way, then choose not to opt out, whether because
his individual claim is not worth enough to pursue on his own dime (Churchill Village) or
for no readily apparent reason (Integra), and allow class counsel and the named plaintiffs
to haggle with the defendant over a settlement. Then, once a settlement is agreed upon,
rather than intervening, a plaintiff need only object at the fairness hearing (Devlin) if the
settlement does not meet his standards, and his right to appeal its approval will be
preserved. This right of appeal, of course, would extend to all nonnamed plaintiffs who
speak up at the fairness hearing.129 Is this a good result?
On the one hand, this result protects nonnamed plaintiffs in a (b)(3) class who
could not or did not envision that class counsel or the named plaintiffs would possibly
negotiate a deal that would prove to be so adverse to their interests. However, there
seems to be little justification for allowing a plaintiff to effectively opt in (by not opting
out) for settlement negotiations, ride the coattails of the named plaintiffs and counsel in
negotiating a settlement, and then object if class counsel is unable to secure what the
nonnamed plaintiff desired.130 There are at least three checks already built in to the
process to protect the interest of nonnamed plaintiffs in a (b)(3) class.
First, plaintiffs have the ability to opt out and pursue the claim individually. The
plaintiff who does not opt out because it is not economically justifiable to pursue the
claim individually (presumably because of court and attorney costs relative to potential
settlement or damages) should not be heard to complain when “free” class counsel does
not get them “enough” in settlement negotiations. By choosing to stay in the class rather
than champion their own cause, class members have ventured nothing and gained
something, however minimal. Further, where the terms of the settlement are known and
a class member does not opt out, they should not be allowed to “spoil the settlement” for
the rest of the class.131
Secondly, a 23(e) inquiry requires that a district court judge look into a settlement
agreement to assure that the interests of the class are met, and that the settlement is not
self-serving from the standpoint of the named plaintiffs and class counsel. This function
is best reserved for district, rather than appellate, judges. The Ballard court seems to
have recognized the folly in allowing plaintiffs to opt in (by their silence) to settlement
129

The author recognizes that this represents a simplification of the settlement objection process, but
entrance of the formal objection, by all accounts, is not a cumbersome exercise, requiring little more than a
note stating, “I object.”
130
But see Shutts, 427 U.S. at 810 (“Unlike a defendant in a normal civil suit, an absent class-action
plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in
knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection.”).
131
See Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977) (Denying adequacy of
representation attack and admonishing the objectors, “[w]e believe that [the objectors] should not now be
allowed to play the role of spoilers for a class of more than 31,000 people when they could have chosen not
to be bound by the settlement.”); and advisory committee notes, supra note 6 (describing the full
information and careful consideration to opt out when terms of the settlement are known).

17

negotiations, only to use the objection and appeals process to opt out when the settlement
is later deemed disagreeable.132 Finally, a State Attorney General or other qualified third
party may be invited to serve as an independent, extra-judicial guarantor of the adequacy
of the settlement.133
Ultimately, while only two circuits have weighed in on the issue to date, it seems
likely, and advisable, that the other appeals courts will follow the lead of Ballard, and
heed the language from Devlin suggesting that access to the appellate courts should be
preserved only for objectors who are unwilling parties to a settlement. Courts should
therefore refuse to give those who forewent the opportunity to opt out another kick at the
cat when they are disappointed by the deal netted by their tacitly approved
representatives.
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